
ANALYZING INTER-APPLICATION COMMUNICATION IN ANDROID

Erika Chin
Adrienne Porter Felt
Kate Greenwood
David Wagner
UC Berkeley

INTER-APPLICATION COMMUNICATION




ORGANIZATION


- Android communication model
- Security analysis of Android
- ComDroid
- Analysis of third-party applications
- Recommendations

ANDROID OVERVIEW

- Intents = Android IPC
- Applications are divided into components
- Intents can be sent between components
- Intents can be used for intra- and inter-application communication



EXPLICIT INTENTS




To: MapActivity

Name: MapActivity



Only the specified destination receives this message

IMPLICIT INTENTS



Implicit Intent Action: VIEW


Handles Action: VIEW



Handles Action: DISPLAYTIME



IMPLICIT INTENTS



Implicit Intent Action: VIEW

Handles Action: VIEW




Handles Action: VIEW



SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ANDROID

COMMON DEVELOPER PATTERN: Unique Action Strings




Showtime Search


 $\begin{array}{c} \text{Implicit Intent} \\ \text{Action:} \\ will Update Show times \end{array}$

Handles Actions: will Update Showtimes, showtimes No Location Error

Results UI



COMMON DEVELOPER PATTERN: Unique Action Strings




Showtime Search

Implicit Intent Action: willUpdateShowtimes Handles Actions: will Update Showtimes, showtimes No Location Error


Results UI

ATTACK #1: EAVESDROPPING





Sending Implicit Intents makes communication public

ATTACK #2: Intent Spoofing



Receiving Implicit Intents makes the component public





Typical case Attack case

14

ATTACK #3: MAN IN THE MIDDLE



IMDb App

Handles Action:

willUpdateShowtimes,

showtimesNoLocation

Error

Showtime Search

Results UI

Action: will Update Show times

Man-in-the-Middle App

 $Handles \ Action: \\ will Update Show times, \\ show times No Location Error$

Malicious Receiver

Action: show times No Location Error


ATTACK #4: SYSTEM INTENT SPOOFING

- Background System Broadcast
 - Event notifications sent by the system
 - Some can only be sent by the system
- Receivers become accessible to all applications when listening for system broadcast


System Broadcast

System
Notifier


Action:
BootCompleted




System Intent Spoofing: Failed Attack



System Intent Spoofing: Successful Attack






REAL WORLD EXAMPLE: ICE APP

- ICE App: Allows doctors access to medical information on phones
- Contains a component that listens for the BootCompleted system broadcast
- On receipt of the Intent, it exits the application and locks the screen

REAL WORLD EXAMPLE: ICE





COMDROID



ComDroid analyzes applications to detect Intentbased attack surfaces

EVALUATION

- Manually verified ComDroid's warnings for 20 applications
- 60% of applications examined have at least 1 exploitable IPC vulnerability

Type	# of Warnings	# of Apps
Severe Vulnerability	34	12
Bad Practice	16	6
Spurious Warning	6	6

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Treat inter- and intra-application communication as different cases
- Prevent public internal communication
 - 21% of severe vulnerabilities
 - 63% of bugs due to bad practice
- Verify system broadcasts
 - 6% of severe vulnerabilities
 - 13% of bugs due to bad practice
- Can be fixed by either developers or platform

RELATED WORK

- Enck et al. introduces information leakage through Broadcast Intents and information injection into Receivers
- Burns discusses other common developers' errors

CONCLUSION

- Applications may be vulnerable to other applications through Android Intent communication
- Many developers misuse Intents or do not realize the consequences of their program design
- 60% of applications examined had at least 1 vulnerability
- ComDroid tool to be publically accessible soon at www.comdroid.org

Thank you!

Any questions?